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ABSTRACT 
Like all good theories, market efficiency has major limitations, even though it 
continues to be the source of important and enduring insights. This is a 
conceptual framework on global financial crisis and Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH). Despite the theory’s undoubted limitations, the claim that 
it is responsible for the current worldwide crisis seems wildly exaggerated. 
This paper discusses many of those claims. It was identified that many of these 
claims were without merit and what developing economies need to consider 
and worry about is how they can strategize well to insulate themselves from 
the effects of global financial crisis whenever they arise and even capitalize on 
it to reap maximum benefits from the situation. Since African stock markets 
are seen to be providing investors in the developed economies the benefits of 
portfolio diversification, Ghana should be thinking of what they can benefit 
from the crisis which we refer to as an opportunity in this paper. Leaders in 
emerging economies should not sit aloof and believe that the adverse impact is 
certainly going to affect their economy but they should rather focus on 
minimizing the effects and taking advantage of the distortions in the 
developed economies. 
 




The August 2011 and the 2007–2008 financial crisis (often called the Credit Crunch 
or the Global Financial Crisis) is considered by many economists to be the worst financial 
crisis since 1930s Great depression especially the latter. The effect of the crisis was the 
collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national governments, and 
downturns in stock markets around the world. The housing sector also suffered, resulting in 
numerous evictions and prolonged vacancies. Major businesses failed and there was a 
significant decline in economic activity, leading to a severe global economic recession. The 
cause of this crisis was triggered by liquidity shortfall in the banking system. Economies 
worldwide slowed during this period, as credit tightened and international trade declined. 
Governments and central banks responded with unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary 
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policy expansion and institutional bailouts. The financial crisis came to an end around 2009 
even though there have been some aftershocks. 
Most political leaders in Africa often capitalize on global financial crisis to explain 
their own inappropriateness and mismanagement of their economy to the world crisis. By 
assuming that their economic difficulty is as a result of global crisis they sit aloof hoping that 
the developed economies would resolve it. This perception is really affecting the African 
continent. It must be noted here that any time financial crisis is being resolved leaders of the 
developed economies see to it that the solution would not made their countries worst off. 
African leaders are not involved and hence we should not expect any better outcome for us. 
Yes the world is a global village and the economies are interrelated, but critically speaking 
the African economies correlates inversely with that of the developed world. African leaders 
and economies must understand the world financial crisis and fashion out strategy that would 
propel Africa to the frontiers of developed economies. We should note that crisis is an 
opportunity too (Ceniga, 2013). 
Experts have assigned varying degree of causes of the financial crisis. Among the 
reasons is the fact that the crisis was not a natural disaster, but the result of high risk, complex 
financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and the failure of regulators, the credit 
rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of stock exchange markets. If this 
is true then what is the stand and future of the EMH. There are two main strains in economic 
thought on economic efficiency, which respectively emphasize the distortions created by 
governments and the distortions created by markets. Distortions created by government are 
reduced by decrease in government involvement and distortions created by markets are 
reduced by increase in government involvement. This explains why the financial meltdown 
of 2007 was a distortion by the market and hence the increase in government involvement in 
markets all over Europe, Asia, America. The efficient market hypothesis stipulates that 
competitive financial markets ruthlessly exploit all available information in fixing security 
prices. 
For some two generation ago, the EMH was widely accepted by academic financial 
economists; for example, see Malkiel & Fama (1970). It was generally believed that 
securities markets were extremely efficient in reflecting information about individual stocks 
and about the stock market as a whole. This means that when information arises, the news 
spreads very quickly and is incorporated into the prices of securities without delay. If this is 
true then why do we have financial bubbles? 
The EMH is associated with the idea of a “random walk,” which is a term loosely 
used in the finance literature to characterize a price series where all subsequent price changes 
represent random departures from previous prices. The logic of the random walk idea is that 
if the flow of information is unimpeded and information is immediately reflected in stock 
prices, then tomorrow’s price change will reflect only tomorrow’s news and will be 
independent of the price changes today. But news is by definition unpredictable, and, thus, 
resulting price changes must be unpredictable and random. As a result, prices fully reflect all 
known information, and even uninformed investors buying a diversified portfolio at the 
tableau of prices given by the market will obtain a rate of return as generous as that achieved 
by the experts (Malkiel, 2003). 
This paper examines the attacks on the EMH and the belief that stock prices are 
partially predictable. While we make no attempt to present a complete survey of the 
purported regularities or anomalies in the stock market, we will examine the relationship 
between predictability and efficiency. 
EMH like all good theories has major limitations, even though it continues to be the 
source of important and enduring insights. Despite the theory’s undoubted limitations, the 
claim that it is responsible for the current worldwide crisis seems wildly exaggerated. If the 
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EMH is responsible for asset bubbles, then how will one explain bubbles of 1637 (Dutch 
tulip), 1720 (South Sea Company Bubbles, 1840’s (Railway Mania), 1926 (Florida Land 
Bubbles), and event surrounding market collapse of 1929 as reviewed in works of Cooper 
(2008). All these bubbles happened before the advent of the EMH and modern financial 
economic theory. As the above list suggests, unusually large price run-ups followed by 
unusually large drops have occurred throughout the recorded history of organized markets. 
It’s only the idea of market efficiency that is relatively new to the scene and not bubbles. 
Malkiel (2003) argues that a financial crisis occurred because the financial industry 
was dominated by people who viewed current prices as correct and hence felt it was 
unnecessary to verify true asset values seems wildly at odds with what we see in practice. 
That is the theory that current prices of stocks reflect their true value in reality is at variance 
with practice.  
Almost all investment money is actively managed, despite all the evidence of 
academic and industry studies showing that active managers fail to beat the market in an 
average year. Much of the enormous losses by banks and investment banks in 2007-2008 
originated in their trading desks and proprietary portfolios, whose strategies and very 
existence were premised on making money from market mispricing. Investors who poured 
money into the property market, stock market, and other asset markets in the years while the 
“bubbles” were forming seemed to do so in the belief that prices would continue to rise, with 
the implication that they believed current prices were incorrect. It seems inconsistent to argue 
simultaneously that asset price “bubbles” occur and that investors passively believe current 
asset prices are correct. Yet this is precisely what many EMH critics have claimed.  
It believed that 2007–2008 financial crisis will have been averted if more 
homeowners, speculators, investors, and banks had indeed viewed current asset prices as 
correct. The related argument that when asset prices are rising rapidly their level is not 
subject to scrutiny by investors also seems wildly at variance with the facts. For this reason it 
is not surprising that blame for the crisis is leveled at EMH. Many investors and employees 
have incurred considerable losses, regulators have lost face, and scapegoats are sorely 
needed. The EMH is a natural candidate. It sounds academic. It is not welcomed by most 
money managers because it states what they are not honest enough to admit to their clients 
that they operate in a fiercely competitive world, populated by a large number of capable and 
ambitious people, just like themselves, and thus superior investment returns are generally 
(though not exclusively) attributable more to luck than insight. To justify their fees, active 
money managers have to argue they are “above average” and consistently beat the market, 
but the EMH and the body of empirical studies supporting it suggests otherwise. To us there 
is less drama, but more insight, to be gained by examining what the crisis tells us about the 
efficient markets theory. What is more interesting that we must find out is whether the rapid 
and substantial fall in prices that occurred across countries and asset classes invalidate the 
notion of market efficiency? 
 
EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS (EMH) AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
An important assumption about EMH is that competition is very keen among 
stakeholders of the capital market. The effect of this notion is that competition enforces a 
correspondence between revenues and costs. In other words for one to beat the market and 
make more profit, the nature of competition will require a commensurate increase in cost. 
This means that your net will still be the same and so there is no need for that activity when 
the market is efficient. The issue about EMH is to view changes in asset prices as a function 
of the flow of information to the marketplace.  
In competitive equilibrium, the gains from exploiting public information should 
correspond to the cost of exploiting it. It is known fact that public information is costless to 
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obtain, and hence the gains from its use should be competed away to zero. From this comes 
the prediction that one cannot expect to earn above-normal returns from using publicly 
available information because it already reflected in prices. 
 
MISCONCEPTION ABOUT EMH AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
There are several misconceptions about EMH. Below are some explanations about the 
misconception. 
The EMH Assumes That Return Distributions Do Not Change Over Time 
One principal limitation of market efficiency is that it is completely silent about the 
shapes of the distributions of securities’ returns but assumes that distribution does not change 
(Soros, 2009). This does not imply that past return distributions like the means, variances, 
skewness, and correlation matrices will instinctively repeat themselves in the future but rather 
given a certain amount and kind of publicly available information, security prices are 
“efficient” in the statistical sense in that they have minimum variance forecasts of future 
prices. If markets are not efficient they expose the investor to future price variability. On the 
other hand if the market is efficient no future price reaction to that information is necessary 
and the investors will not be exposed to future price variability. At the core of these 
assumptions has been the theory of efficient and rational markets. 
 
The Market Should Have Predicted the Crisis 
The theory about EMH does say that the market should be able to predict the future 
and hence any possible financial crisis. If we say it is possible to predict financial crisis then 
we are rather saying the market is inefficient because current market price would not reflect 
the information embodied in the prediction. It is possible to predict that large market changes 
will occur but the difficult is when that will happen. In other words we can predict stock price 
changes but not when the changes will occur. That is one cannot predict that start and the end 
of a financial crisis. 
 
No One Should Act On Information 
If investors do not act on information the market would cease to be efficient. The 
misunderstanding arises from confusing efficiency as a statement about the equilibrium 
resulting from investors’ actions with the actions themselves. Investors act on information in 
a fiercely competitive market, and the average investor is not expected to make abnormal 
returns. The implication here is that on the average investors would not make abnormal 
returns by acting on information, which doesn’t mean that investors should not act on 
information. Very few investors would gain on the average when they act on information.  
This is the essence of the claim that market participants were seduced into believing 
that since market prices already reflected all available information and hence nothing to gain 
from producing or searching for information. For this critics of EMH believe that it made 
people not to act on information allowing security prices to digress significantly from their 
market values. This is not true. 
 
The Stock Market Should Have Prompted Us of Financial Crisis 
Bubbles are always identified after the fact and it will be very difficult for the market 
to know in financial crisis. One way of determining whether the market knew about a 
possible financial is to find out whether investors tried to liquidate their investment. That is 
investors converting their investment into cash. This change should be huge and sudden. In 
short EMH will not know about a possible financial crisis. Immediately this is identified by 
the market the bubble will burst because there will be huge selling of stocks pushing price to 
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free fall. By this test, we are skeptical about the possibility of identifying financial crisis 
except in hindsight. 
 
Financial Regulators Mistakenly Relied On the EMH 
One principal action of regulators or regulation is to remove the impediments which 
might produce inefficient and illiquid markets. For this reason some analysts and policy 
implementers believe that financial meltdown is as a result excessively lax in supervision by 
appropriate bodies. In short it believed that more and proper regulation is the key to avert 
future financial meltdown. In contrast to EMH, regulators are to ensure an adequate flow of 
reliable information to the public and nothing more. Regulators are not telling investors what 
to do with their investment but rather to provide a uniform playing field for investors. 
 
Financial Difficulties of Financial Institutions Indicate the Market Is Inefficient 
It is believed that if the market is efficient companies and institutions should collapse. 
EMH does not mean investors cannot make big gains on their investment. If it possible to 
make big gain so is it possible to make big losses. In a competitive capital market, if you take 
massive risky positions you are bound to lose big no matter how large and venerable the 
investor is. Market efficiency does not mean there will be no spectacular failures of large 
banks or investment banks. Market efficiency does not depend on the size of the investor or 
institution. 
 
LESSONS FROM EMH AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
It must be noted that EMH is a theory and not a fact and that it is an abstraction from 
reality. For now there is no theory which can totally determine our thoughts or our actions. 
We would be disappointed if we take EMH literally. They are ways of implementing the 
basic ideas in a theory, using more detailed and more specific assumptions that adapt the 
theory for particular purposes. They cannot and should not be taken literally. For instance, the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model takes the basic concept of correct pricing and adds a number of 
assumptions about return distributions to come up with a more specific and implementable 
pricing model. It is therefore less robust than the basic idea of correct pricing. People who 
take models literally are in for a very big disappointment. No theory can explain everything. 
It must also be noted here that theoretically, EMH has many obvious limitations. The 
most important of these limitations stem from the fact that EMH makes no statements 
whatsoever about the “supply side” of the information market. That is about how much 
information is available, whether it comes from accounting reports or statements by managers 
or government statistical releases, what its reliability is, how continuous it is, the frequency 
of extreme events, and so forth. The theory addresses only the demand side of the market. 
The EMH says only that, given the supply of information, investors will trade on it until in 
equilibrium there are no further gains from trading. Consequently, the EMH is silent about 
the shapes of return distributions and how they evolve over time. An almost exclusive focus 
on the demand side is perhaps the single biggest weakness of modern financial economics, 
generally.  
In addition to these limitations of EMH that stem from ignoring the supply side of the 
information, there are number of others worth noting: 
• In reality, investor has different information and beliefs but is modeled in the EMH as 
an objective commodity that has the same meaning for all investors 
• Information processing is assumed in the EMH to be costless, and hence information 
is incorporated into prices immediately and exactly. Cost of information could be 
costless but the cost of processing information cannot be costless and it is an 
important element in cost of information. While it seems reasonable to assume that 
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the cost to investors of acquiring public information is negligible, information 
processing (or interpretation) costs are an entirely different matter 
• Market efficiency does not clearly explain the role of transaction cost. The EMH 
assumes the markets themselves are costless to operate. Generally speaking, stock 
markets are paradigm examples of low-cost, high-volume markets, but they are not 
entirely without costs. The issue is that if there are pricing errors that are not 
eliminated because they are smaller than the transactions costs of exploiting them, is 
the market judged to be efficient or inefficient 
• Similarly, the EMH implicitly assumes continuous trading, and hence ignores 
liquidity effects. There is evidence that illiquidity is a “priced” factor, which is, higher 
returns compensate for lower liquidity. Few would take the fact that markets are 
closed on weekends or overnight as a serious violation of market efficiency 
• The EMH also is silent on the issue of investor taxes. In reality, many investors pay 
taxes on dividends and capital gains, with some offsets for capital losses. The effects 
of investor taxation on security prices and expected returns are potentially large, but 
not well understood. 
We could conclude from the above that the EMH adopts a simplified view of markets and 
that should not be translated to mean that EMH is cause of financial meltdown. 
 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS 
One of the important lessons for Ghana from the global financial crisis is that the 
world is more complex than many thought, and certainly is more complex than most pricing 
models used in practice. Did the simplicity of the models employed by researchers, from 
1970 Fama’s formulation of EMH through to specific pricing models, lure people into 
thinking that the EMH meant the same things as the models? That is not true. One can’t 
blame a theory for people misusing it. It is a means of ensuring efficient allocation of scarce 
resources. 
It must be noted here that efficiency of the market correlate positively with the 
performance of the market. Research has proved that due to the low correlation that 
developing economies have with developed economies, African stock markets are seen to be 
providing investors the benefits of portfolio diversification (Harvey, 1995). If this finding is 
anything to go by one should capitalize on any bubble burst in the developed securities 
markets to market the securities markets of the emerging markets. This is not to say 
developing countries should be working for global crisis to occur but they should make good 
use when they occur to bridge the gap between the developed and developing. It should also 
be noted here that total collapse of global financial market will also be a big problem for 
developing countries like Ghana. A prolong crisis will also have negative effect on 
developing countries as well. Global financial crisis are to be interpreted as an indication of 
the need for investors to equally pay attention to investments in developing countries if they 
want to reduce their risk. 
Proper functioning of the financial market is crucial to economic growth and 
development. This is because if the securities markets are efficient, scarce resources in 
Africa, in particular Ghana would be allocated to where they are needed most. 
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